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International and Intranational 
Market Segmentation and 
Integration in West Africa
Jenny C. Aker, Michael W. Klein, and 
Stephen A. O’Connell
6.1 Introduction
What muffles, or amplifies, the voice of the Walrasian auctioneer? This 
question is of more than theoretical interest since a common policy goal is 
fostering market integration, especially across international borders. The 
welfare benefits of policies that succeed in integrating cross- border markets 
are likely to be greater in low- income countries, especially the landlocked 
countries of sub- Saharan Africa, than in industrial countries. But can gov-
ernment policies like tariff reductions actually increase market integration in 
the presence of political or social barriers that impede trade? Can regional 
investments in transport infrastructure help create unified markets in the 
face of corruption at the border? Put more simply, do borders pose a sig-
nificant challenge to market integration in sub- Saharan Africa? Or does 
the Walrasian auctioneer have as clear and loud a voice across countries in 
sub- Saharan Africa as elsewhere?
Jenny C. Aker is associate professor of development economics at the Fletcher School at 
Tufts University. Michael W. Klein is the William L. Clayton Professor of International Eco-
nomic Affairs at the Fletcher School at Tufts University and a research associate of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. Stephen A. O’Connell is the Gil and Frank Mustin Professor 
of Economics at Swarthmore College.
A significantly revised and updated version of  this chapter, using new data, new econo-
metric techniques, and with a new coauthor (Muzhe Yang) was published in the Journal of 
Development Economics (March 2014: vol. 107, 1– 16.). This research was partially funded by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Africa Project. We would like to thank 
participants at seminars at the Center for Global Development, National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), Northeast Universities Development Economic Conference (NEUDC), 
Université de Clermont- Ferrand, and University of Gottingen for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. All errors are our own. For acknowledgments, sources of research support, and 
disclosure of the author’s or authors’ material financial relationships, if  any, please see http:// 
www .nber .org/ chapters/ c13438.ack.
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Answers to these questions that are based on the volume of  trade are 
mixed. Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) show that the level of trade among 
African countries is actually higher than that predicted by a gravity model. 
But other research suggests that intra- African trade is too low, due to inter-
nal political tensions and mismanagement of economic policies (Longo and 
Sekkat 2004). Oyejide, Elbadawi, and Collier (1997) observe that competing 
national priorities have repeatedly undermined formal attempts at regional 
integration in Africa, while Azam (2007) stresses the role of informal trade 
in arbitraging the cross- border price differences created by divergent na-
tional trade policies.
In this chapter, we address the impact of political borders on intra- African 
trade by focusing on prices rather than trade volumes.1 We consider prices of 
two staple grains (millet and sorghum) and one cash crop (cowpeas) in mar-
kets in Niger and Nigeria. We look at price dispersion in cross- border mar-
kets as compared to price dispersions in different markets within the same 
country. This follows the strand of empirical literature that compares price 
dispersion in spatially separated markets in industrial countries. Results in 
that literature show that price dispersion is larger when, conditional on dis-
tance, two markets are on either side of an international border than when 
they are in the same country. The seminal contribution by Engel and Rogers 
(1996), and subsequent work on other industrialized countries, such as the 
United States and Japan (Parsley and Wei 2001) and EU countries (Crucini, 
Shintani, and Tsuruga 2010; Crucini, Telmer, and Zachariadis 2005), has 
consistently found a relatively large border effect.2
In this chapter, we show that there is a statistically significant border effect, 
that is, conditional price dispersion is higher between a market in Niger and 
Nigeria than between two markets in Niger, or two markets in Nigeria. But 
this border effect is much lower than what has been found for industrial 
countries. Furthermore, we also show that the border effect is lower if  the 
cross- border markets share a common ethnic profile, while the effect of eth-
nicity is to raise conditional price dispersion between two ethnically distinct 
1. Border effects in low- income countries have not been the subject of much research, partly 
due to the lack of high- frequency data on narrowly defined goods. Cross- border comparisons 
have typically been restricted to a small number of locations and over a limited time period. 
Daubrée (1995) compares the prices of a range of consumer goods between Niamey (the capi-
tal of Niger), Maradi (Niger), and Kano (Nigeria), and finds tighter comovements between 
Maradi and Kano than between Maradi and Niamey. Oyejide, Ogunkola, and Bankole et al. 
(2005) compare prices for markets within Nigeria with those in between the capitals of Niger, 
Togo, and Benin, and finds suggestive evidence of a border effect. Araujo- Bonjean, Aubert, 
and Egg (2008), use a vector autoregression model to estimate integration of  millet prices 
between countries within the CFA zone (Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso), and find a statisti-
cally significant border effect.
2. As discussed in more detail below, Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009) have shown that these 
estimates overstate the border effect when they do not take into account underlying differences 
in price heterogeneity between countries.
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markets in Niger. We also show that the presence of mobile phones mitigates 
the international border effect, which extends the intra- Niger results in Aker 
(2010) to an international setting.
The results presented here offer a positive message with regard to ongoing 
efforts to integrate West African economies. These countries have attempted 
to foster trade and economic integration through a system of monetary 
and trade unions such as the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(or UEMOA), a customs and monetary union created in 1994 that shares 
a common currency (the CFA franc) and a common external tariff.3 The 
UEMOA is also part of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), a regional integration initiative created in 2001 among all West 
African states. More specifically for the two countries studied in this chapter, 
the National Boundary Commission of Nigeria and a Nigeria– Niger Joint 
Commission (NNJC) have convened transborder workshops to address 
issues of  cross- border trade. Our results with respect to the effect of  the 
border on price dispersion suggest the positive potential of these efforts.
The rest of  the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides a 
context for our analysis by discussing some relevant characteristics of Niger, 
including the establishment of its international border with Nigeria and the 
geographic nature of its ethnic divisions. Section 6.3 describes the data we 
use and provides some preliminary statistics. Section 6.4 present an anal-
ysis of the international border effect based on conditional distributions, 
while section 6.5 analyzes the market- pair data using regressions. Section 
6.6 presents the results for internal borders. We offer some conclusions in 
section 6.7.
6.2 Niger and Its Trade
Niger is a large, sparsely populated, landlocked country in West Africa. 
The majority of its population consists of rural subsistence farmers who 
depend upon rain- fed agriculture as their main source of food and income. It 
is one of the poorest countries in the world. It was ranked last on the United 
Nations’ 2009 Human Development Index.
The primary trading partner of Niger is its southern neighbor, Nigeria, 
a coastal country that has the largest population in Africa. The 1,500 km 
border between Niger (a former French colony) and Nigeria (a former Brit-
ish colony) was established by the French and the British in 1906. The border 
separated the Hausa, Zarma, Fulani, and Kanuri ethnic groups between the 
two countries. As shown in figure 6.1, the border drawn by the colonial pow-
ers also created a Niger that included eight ethnic groups (Hausa, Songhai/ 
3. The CFA franc was created in 1945, and was devalued in 1948 and 1994 (changing the rela-
tive value of the CFA franc to the French franc). The current CFA franc is pegged to the euro.
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Zarma, Toureg, Fulani, Kanuri, Arab, Toubou, and Gourmantche) which 
were, for the most part, situated in geographically distinct regions of the 
country.4
The border between Niger and Nigeria was porous and haphazardly 
patrolled at the time the two countries achieved independence in 1960. 
Smuggling was a major economic activity.5 Trade between the two coun-
tries was primarily in agropastoral products such as grains, legumes, and 
livestock (Collins 1976), but “unofficial traders” also brought petroleum 
and farm- chemical products into Niger (Charlick 1991). There have been 
4. A map of Nigeria in 1957– 1958 (not shown) also suggests that the geographic location 
of ethnic groups in Niger and Nigeria seems to be time invariant, as it is similar to the ethno-
graphic maps for 2008.
5. Azam (2007) provides an analytical treatment of the determinants of illegal cross- border 
trade in the region.
Fig. 6.1 International borders and ethnic groups in Niger and northern Nigeria
Notes: A map of the ethnic and international borders for Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, 
and Nigeria. Created from the authors’ household and trader- level data collected between 
2005 and 2007, as well as secondary data for markets in Burkina Faso and Mali.
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efforts since the early 1970s to harmonize the relationship between the two 
countries and remove official obstacles to trade. Currently, both countries 
are members of ECOWAS.
The sample period studied in this chapter is 1999– 2007. There were no 
official trade restrictions or border closings during this time (although there 
had been border closings in 1983 and 1986, linked to political instability 
in Nigeria). There are, however, other possible sources of  costs of  trade 
between these countries. Nigerien- Nigerian trade could be hampered by 
costs due to delays, harassment, or banditry. Furthermore, trade between 
these two countries could be impeded by costs associated with changing 
currencies between the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc of 
Niger and the Nigerian naira. There are also linguistic differences, both 
between the official languages of Niger and Nigeria (French and English, 
respectively), and in local languages in different regions of each country.
6.3 Data
The motivation for using prices in different locations to test for the pres-
ence of an international border is straightforward; if  borders impose costs 
that undermine trade, then, conditional on distance between markets and 
other location- specific factors, price differences between markets located in 
different countries should be larger than those between markets in the same 
country. Thus our analysis requires both price data and other data used to 
control for distances between markets and location- specific features in Niger 
and Nigeria.
The analysis in this chapter uses a data set that draws on both primary and 
secondary sources in Niger and Nigeria. The price data consist of monthly 
observations of prices of two grains (millet and sorghum) and a cash crop 
(cowpeas) over a nine- year period (1999– 2007) across forty- eight domestic 
and cross- border markets.6 Each of these commodities is produced and con-
sumed in both countries, is heavily traded on an annual basis, and is fairly 
homogeneous in terms of quality.
Time- series data on gas prices, mobile phone coverage, rainfall, road qual-
ity, trade flows, district population levels, mobile phone rollout and coverage, 
and the official naira- CFA exchange rate were also collected. In addition 
to these time series, we employ data on the latitude and longitude of each 
market, the location of  the international border, and the road distances 
between market pairs. These series enable us to calculate the distance to the 
international and internal border of each market in the data set, as well as 
the Euclidean distances and actual road distances between market pairs.
6. Grain prices were collected by Niger’s agricultural marketing information system, which 
converted prices in Nigerian markets into CFA using the CFA/ naira exchange rate of that day. 
We do not have access to the original price data in naira, nor to the daily CFA/ naira exchange 
rates used for the price conversion.
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Our analysis also uses a unique panel survey of traders, farmers, trans-
porters, and market resource persons collected in Niger by Aker between 
2005 and 2007. The survey data draw on interviews with 415 traders and 205 
farmers located in thirty- five markets and forty villages across six geographic 
regions of Niger, as well as in five Nigerian markets. A census of all grain 
traders was conducted in each market, in which traders and market- resource 
persons who participated in the survey provided detailed information about 
their demographic and socioeconomic background and commercial opera-
tions. These data allow us to construct measures of the ethnolinguistic frac-
tionalization (ELF) for each market, village, and region, to identify ethnic 
“borders,” and to measure the number of traders operating in these markets 
over time.
Table 6.1 presents summary statistics for markets located within a 150 km 
Table 6.1 Comparison of observables by country (Niger-Nigeria)
Unconditional mean Difference in means
Observables  Mean (s. d.)  Mean (s. d.)  Difference (s. e.)
A. Market-pair-level data Niger-Niger Nigeria-Nigeria
Distance between markets (km) 375.29(207) 369(271) 6.29(65)
Road quality between markets .37(.49) .6(.52) –.22(.16)
Mobile phone coverage (2007) .89(.32) .6(.52) .29*(.16)
Transport costs between markets (CFA/ kg) 12.35(6.72) 12.19(6.67) .16(.22)
B. Market-level data Niger Nigeria
Millet price level (CFA/ kg) 124.33(33) 112.96(31) 11.37***(1.83)
Sorghum price level (CFA/ kg) 119(36) 104(34.8) 14.35***(2.04)
Cowpea price level (CFA/ kg) 173(56) 176 (56) –3.21(3.36)
Ethnic composition of traders
 Hausa .58(.51) .8(.447) –.21(.21)
 Zarma .29(.464) 0 .29***(.096)
 Kanuri .08(.27) .2 (.447) –.12(.19)
Road quality to market .71(.46) .75(.5) .041(.25)
Market size 105.08(90) 176.75(149) –71.66(69)
Mobile phone coverage (2007) .95(.020) .8(.447) .158(.19)
Drought between 1999 and 2007 .027(.162) .025(.156) .002(.007)
Urban center(> = 35,000)  .35(.49)  0.8 (.45)  .45*(.21)
Notes: Data are from secondary sources and the Niger trader survey collected by Aker. In panel A, “Ni-
ger” market pairs are pairs where both markets are located in Niger; “border” market pairs are those 
pairs where both markets are located in a border country (Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso). In panel B, 
“Niger” markets are those that are located within Niger (150 km from the international border), whereas 
“border” markets are those markets located outside of Niger (but within 150 km of the border). Huber-
White robust standard errors clustered by market-pair month (panel A) and by market month (panel B) 
are in parentheses. Prices are in CFA francs, deflated by the Nigerien Consumer Price Index. The Kol-
mogorov-Smirnov test tests for the equality of the distribution functions.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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radius of the Niger- Nigeria border. In general, prices for staple grains (mil-
let and sorghum) are higher in Niger than in Nigeria, with a statistically 
significant difference between the two. This is consistent with the direction 
of trade between the two countries, with Niger importing grains from Nige-
ria. By contrast, cowpea prices are lower in Niger; while the difference is 
not statistically significant, the point estimate is as expected since Niger 
primarily exports to Nigeria. We do not reject the equality of  means or 
distributions for most other observable characteristics, with the exception 
of mobile phone coverage and the prevalence of the Zarma ethnic group. 
However, the difference in mobile phone coverage as of 2007 is only statisti-
cally significant at the 10 percent level. In addition, the Nigerian markets in 
our sample are only located in the Hausa region of that country, and none 
are in Nigeria’s Zarma region.7
6.4 Analysis of Distributions
Our first analysis of the international border effect for markets in Niger 
and Nigeria uses the data described above to construct kernel distributions 
for conditional price differences across countries and within countries. We 
estimate regressions of the form:
(1) ln pjt
i / pkt
i( ) = b0 +b1X jkt + ut + a jk + ´ jkt ,
where pjt
i  and pkt
i  are the CFA franc prices of good i in markets j and k at 
time t, deflated by Niger’s consumer price index. The regressors in this spec-
ification include Xjkt, a vector of observable characteristics that affect price 
dispersion between two markets, including transport costs between markets 
j and k at time t, a dummy variable that equals 1 if  one and only one of the 
two markets is urban, and another dummy variable that equals 1 if  one and 
only one had a drought at time t. The variable θαt represents time fixed 
effects. In some specifications market- pair fixed effects, αjk, are also included. 
Separate regressions are run for market pairs within each country, and 
also for cross- border pairs. We plot a kernel distribution of the residuals jkt 
from each regression, to examine relative conditional deviations from the 
Law of One Price.
Figures 6.2A, 6.2B, and 6.2C present the kernel distributions of jkt from 
a regression of equation (1) for millet, sorghum, and cowpeas, respectively, 
for the entire 1999– 2007 period. Each of these three figures includes the 
kernel distribution for the residuals of a regression using intra- Niger mar-
ket pairs, a regression using intra- Nigeria market pairs, and a regression 
using cross- border (Niger- Nigeria) market pairs. Visual inspection of the 
7. While members of the Zarma ethnic group live within Nigeria, they represent a small 
percentage of the population (approximately 88,000 people, or less than .0007 percent) and 
are geographically focused in the far northwestern region of the country, on the border with 
Benin and Niger (the Birin n’Kebbi region).
Fig. 6.2A Kernel distributions of millet, sorghum, and cowpeas for Niger and 
 Nigeria (1999– 2006), ln price difference for intranational and cross- border pairs: 
Millet pairs < 300 km: Residuals on ln(transport costs), urban, drought
Fig. 6.2B Kernel distributions of millet, sorghum, and cowpeas for Niger and 
 Nigeria (1999– 2006), ln price differences for intranational and cross- border market 
pairs: Sorghum pairs < 300 km: Residuals on ln(transport costs), urban, drought
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kernel distributions suggests that the underlying volatilities of market- pair 
price differentials are similar across countries for grains and cowpeas. The 
distributions show a modest horizontal displacement across countries, sug-
gesting that even if  there is a statistically significant border effect, it may not 
be economically important.
These cross- sectional results, however, may mask differences across time. 
In particular, we are interested in investigating whether exchange rate move-
ments between the naira and CFA franc alter relative prices, which would 
be consistent with a lack of full- market integration across the international 
border. There was a strong appreciation of the CFA franc relative to the 
naira between 1999 and 2001 and 2002 and 2004.8 If  cross- border markets 
were not well integrated, we would expect to see increases in the price of 
millet, sorghum, and cowpeas in Niger relative to those in Nigeria during 
these periods.9
To investigate conditional price dispersion over time, we estimate equation 
(1) for cross- border pairs separately for three marketing years (1999/ 2000, 
2000/ 2001, and 2001/ 2002) using the observed price differences (rather than 
absolute values, as above) between Niger and Nigeria for millet, sorghum, 
and cowpeas, and plot the kernel distributions of the residuals from these 
Fig. 6.2C Kernel distributions of millet, sorghum, and cowpeas for Niger and 
 Nigeria (1999– 2006), ln price differences for intranational and cross- border market 
pairs: Cowpeas pairs < 300km: Residuals on ln(transport costs), urban, drought
8. There was a 16 percent appreciation of the CFA against the naira between 1999 and 2001.
9. Gopinath et al. (2009) find that relative costs of similar goods in Canada and the United 
States closely track the exchange rate.
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regressions in figures 6.3A, 6.3B, and 6.3C. Figures 6.3A and 6.3B show 
a rightward shift in the distributions of millet and sorghum, respectively, 
between 1999/ 2000 and 2000/ 2001, the period during which there was an 
appreciation of  the CFA/ naira exchange rate. This suggests that relative 
prices follow the CFA franc- naira exchange rate, which could reflect a lack 
of market integration. A more formal test of market integration is offered 
by the regression analysis presented in the next section.
6.5 Regression Analysis
In this section we present a more precise analysis of  the border effect, 
following the method of an early and influential contribution to this litera-
ture, Engel and Rogers (1996). They compare price dispersion for fourteen 
categories of goods among 228 market pairs (each pair represents two cities 
in the United States, two cities in Canada, or one in the United States and 
the other in Canada) through regressions with the specification:
(2) sij = b1 ln dij( ) +b2Bij + gmDm + ´ij
m=1
N
∑
where σij is a measure of price dispersion between cities i and j, dij is the 
distance between these cities, Bij equals 1 if  cities i and j are in different 
countries and 0 otherwise, and Dm is a set of city- specific dummy variables. 
Fig. 6.3A Kernel distributions for Niger- Nigeria market pairs by year (1999– 
2001), ln P(Niger) – ln P(Nigeria): Millet residuals on drought, distance < 100 km
Fig. 6.3B Kernel distributions for Niger- Nigeria market pairs by year (1999– 
2001), ln P(Niger) – ln P(Nigeria): Sorghum residuals on drought, distance  
< 100 km
Fig. 6.3C Kernel distributions for Niger- Nigeria market pairs by year (1999– 
2001), ln P(Niger) – ln P(Nigeria): Cowpeas residuals on drought, distance  
< 100 km
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The estimated coefficient β2 represents the conditional change in price dis-
persion between two cities due to the fact that they are in different countries. 
The estimated border effect, that is, the distance- equivalent effect of  the 
border, is exp(b1 / b2 ).
Engel and Rogers find strikingly large effects of the international border 
on price dispersion; one estimate puts the distance- equivalent effect at over 
70,000 km. Other research reports similar magnitudes for border effects 
between industrial countries. But Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009) show 
that differences in underlying price volatility in two countries can result in 
an upwardly biased estimate of the border effect, since comparing cross- 
country pairs of  prices reflects both differences in underlying price vari-
ability in one of the countries as compared to the other as well as the costs 
associated with crossing the border between the countries. They demon-
strate that the inclusion of a dummy variable for pairs of locations within 
one country can result in very different estimates than those obtained when 
including a dummy variable for pairs of locations in the other country, if  
there are wide differences in price volatility across the two countries. For 
example, with the Engel and Rogers data, the estimated distance- equivalent 
border effect based on a specification that includes a Canada- Canada fixed 
effect is 47 km while the one based on a specification that includes a United 
States- United States fixed effect is 108 million km.
The Gorodnichenko and Tesar effect might be expected to be less of a 
concern for our analysis than for that of Engel and Rogers since, as shown in 
figures 6.2A, 6.2B, and 6.2C, the distribution of absolute price differences for 
Niger- Niger pairs differs very little from the distribution for Nigeria- Nigeria 
pairs. As will be shown, this conjecture is supported by a comparison of 
border effects between regressions that include a dummy variable for Niger- 
Niger pairs and those that use a dummy variable for Nigeria- Nigeria pairs.
To implement the Engel- Rogers approach, we estimate a version of equa-
tion (1) with a dummy variable for cross- border market pairs,
(3) ln( pjt
i pkt
i ) = b1Bjk +b2X jkt + gmDm + ut + ´ jkt
m=1
N
∑
where Bjk and Dm are defined as above, Xjkt is a vector of variables that might 
affect price dispersion between two markets, such as drought, road quality, 
transport costs, and other time- varying factors, and θt is a vector of monthly 
fixed effects. One version of  this specification does not include a binary 
variable for country- specific pairs. In light of  the Gorodnochenko- Tesar 
critique, we estimate two additional versions, one containing an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if  both locations in the pair are in Niger, and the other 
containing an indicator variable that equals 1 if  both locations in the pair 
are in Nigeria.
Table 6.2 shows the results of the regressions that take the form of equa-
tion (3). There is a separate panel for each of the three commodities. Column 
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(1) of each panel shows that the international border is associated with a 
statistically significant increase in price dispersion for each of the three com-
modities, contributing a 2.6 percent increase in price dispersion for millet, 
a 2.3 percent increase for sorghum, and a 2.9 percent increase for cowpeas. 
The magnitude and statistical significance of the border effect is robust to 
the inclusion of a binary variable that identifies Niger- Niger market pairs 
(column [2] in each panel) and another that identifies Nigeria- Nigeria mar-
ket pairs (column [3] in each panel), suggesting that country- specific differ-
ences in price dispersion are not driving our results.10
The border effect could arise for a number of reasons. One reason is asso-
ciated with the difficulty in obtaining timely information on prices across an 
international border. Aker (2010) has shown that, within Niger, the advent 
of mobile phone coverage led to a reduction in price dispersion. Does the 
same effect hold across the Niger- Nigeria border?
Evidence presented in column (4) of each panel shows that the mobile- 
phone effect does, in fact, hold internationally, as well as within countries. 
Column (4) augments the basic specification (in column [1]) with two binary 
variables. The first binary variable is equal to 1 if  both markets have mobile 
phone coverage at time t, and is otherwise 0. The second is an interaction 
of  the mobile phone coverage variable with the border dummy variable. 
In this specification, the excluded category is internal markets that do not 
have mobile phone coverage. The coefficient on the border dummy variable 
therefore represents the border effect for markets that cannot communicate 
by mobile phone (because at least one of  the markets is not covered by 
mobile phone service), while the coefficient on the mobile phone coverage 
variable represents the effect of mobile phone coverage on internal market 
pairs. The border effect for market pairs that can communicate by mobile 
phone is given by the sum of the coefficients on the border dummy variable 
and the interaction variable.
The estimates presented in column (4) of each panel of table 6.2 show 
that mobile phone coverage is associated with a statistically significant 
decrease in price dispersion across internal markets for all three commodi-
ties.11 Although mobile phones reduce price dispersion for internal market 
pairs, the border still “matters” for all commodities, even between markets 
that can communicate by mobile phone, since the joint effect of the border 
dummy variable and the interaction term remains positive and statistically 
significant. Not surprisingly, the border effect remains significant for market 
pairs that cannot communicate by mobile phone, again for all three com-
10. As discussed by Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009), it is impossible to include the bor-
der dummy variable and both market- pair dummy variables because of multicollinearity. The 
results presented in this table are all robust to the use of dyadic standard errors.
11. Aker (2010) finds the introduction of mobile phones was associated with a negative and 
statistically significant reduction in price dispersion across millet markets within Niger, and that 
this effect was the strongest for markets located between 200 and 550 km apart.
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modities, as shown by the positive and significant coefficients on the border 
dummy variable in the column (4) estimates.
6.6 Price Dispersion across Ethnic Regions in Niger
There has been a growing interest recently in economic research investi-
gating the role that ethnic or cultural diversity can play in explaining socio-
economic outcomes. A number of empirical studies have found that ethnic 
diversity is associated with lower growth rates (Easterly and Levine 1997), 
more corruption (Mauro 1995), lower contributions to local public goods 
(Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999), and lower participation in groups and 
associations (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). In this section, we contribute 
to this stream of research by investigating whether ethnic diversity creates 
“internal borders” to trade, and hence market segmentation.
The process through which borders were established in West Africa 
resulted in multiple ethnic groups within Niger, as noted above. Also, as 
mentioned earlier, these ethnic groups generally live in geographically dis-
tinct regions of the country. We focus on two of the major ethnic groups in 
Niger, the Hausa and the Zarma, and consider whether there is a statistically 
significant and economically meaningful “border” between the regions they 
inhabit in Niger.
We identify the Hausa and Zarma regions of Niger through the use of 
both secondary and primary data on the ethnic composition of geographic 
locations within the country. We use the degree of ethnic diversity across 
locations to locate the ethnic Hausa/ Zarma border as a linear spline running 
roughly south to north that separates two geographic locations with a low 
degree of ethnic diversity (i.e., a strong majority of Hausa or Zarma). Mar-
kets on the “border” are omitted from the analysis; they have a higher degree 
of ethnic diversity, that is, a more even mix between Hausa and Zarma, than 
markets on either side of the border.12
Having identified an intra- Niger ethnic border, we now analyze its eco-
nomic consequences for price dispersion using the two methods employed 
above to study the effects of  the Niger- Nigeria border. We begin with a 
graphical analysis. Figures 6.4A, 6.4B, and 6.4C show the kernel distribu-
tions of the jkt of  a specification like equation (1) but with a distinction 
between the Hausa and Zarma regions of Niger rather than the countries 
of Niger and Nigeria. In this case, the distinction is made between Hausa- 
Hausa market pairs in Niger, Zarma- Zarma market pairs in Niger, and 
12. The measure of  ethnic diversity used almost universally in the empirical literature is 
the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF ), which is a decreasing transformation of 
the Herfindahl concentration index. In particular, if  we consider a society composed of K ≥ 
2 different ethnic groups and let pk indicate the share of group k in the total population, the 
resulting value of the ELF index is given by 1 – ∑(pk)
2. Thus, a lower value of the ELF index 
indicates a higher degree of ethnic homogeneity.
Fig. 6.4A Kernel distributions for Zarma and Hausa market pairs. Absolute ln 
price differences: Millet, intra- Niger, < 300km: Residuals on ln(TC), urban, drought
Fig. 6.4B Kernel distributions for Zarma and Hausa market pairs. Absolute ln 
price differences: Sorghum, intra- Niger, < 300 km: Residuals on ln(transport costs), 
urban, drought
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cross- ethnic- border pairs that include one location in the Hausa region of 
Niger and the other in the Zarma region. These kernel distributions sug-
gest that the underlying price dispersions for millet, sorghum, and cowpeas 
in each region are similar but, unlike the kernel distributions for Niger- 
Nigeria market pairs, the distribution of price dispersion between Zarma 
and Hausa markets seems markedly different than the distributions for intra- 
Hausa and intra- Zarma market pairs. This suggests that the internal Hausa- 
Zarma border may have greater consequences for price dispersion within 
Niger than the Nigerian border does for price dispersion between the two 
countries.
Regression estimates confirm this impression. The three panels of table 
6.3 present the regression estimates of  equation (3) for each commodity 
although, in this case, the sample only includes market- pair data from the 
Hausa and Zarma regions of Niger and the “border” represents the intra- 
Niger division between these two regions. These regression results show that 
this internal border is associated with a positive and statistically significant 
increase in price dispersion for each commodity. Column (1) of each panel 
shows that the internal ethnic border between the Hausa and Zarma regions 
is significant for all three commodities. The magnitude of this intranational 
ethnic border effect exceeds that of  the international border effect in all 
cases; the estimated ethnic border effect is more than double the interna-
tional border effect for millet, more than 60 percent larger for cowpeas, and 
Fig. 6.4C Kernel distributions for Zarma and Hausa market pairs. Absolute ln 
price differences: Cowpeas, intra- Niger, < 300 km: Residuals on ln(transport costs), 
urban, drought
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more than 10 percent larger for sorghum. As with the estimates presented in 
table 6.2, the significance of these results is robust to the inclusion of region- 
specific fixed effects for intra- Hausa (column [2]) and intra- Zarma (column 
[3]) market pairs, although the value of the effect is sensitive to the inclusion 
of these fixed effects in the case of cowpeas. This is consistent with the visual 
inspection of the kernel distributions in figure 6.4C, which suggested that the 
underlying price dispersion for cowpeas differed considerably in intra- Hausa 
and intra- Zarma regions.
Mobile phone coverage diminishes price dispersion within regions. In 
all three panels in table 6.3, the coefficient on the mobile phone coverage 
variable is significant and negative, suggesting that mobile phones reduce 
price dispersion within the Hausa region and within the Zarma region (Aker 
2010). The magnitude of this reduction is notable, and equal to 1.2 percent 
for millet, 1.7 percent for sorghum, and 4.4 percent for cowpeas. But there 
is less evidence that the reduction in price dispersion occurs across markets 
on either side of the internal ethnic border: the joint effect of the mobile 
phone dummy variable and the interaction term is negative and statistically 
significant for sorghum. While this suggests that mobile phones are less use-
ful across ethnic regions than within them, the result may be confounded to 
some degree with a nonlinear effect of distance. The cross- border market 
pairs in these regressions are less than 250 km apart, and Aker (2010) found 
that mobile phones reduced price dispersion primarily for medium- haul 
markets, namely, those between 200 and 500 km apart. The joint effect of 
the border and interaction term, capturing the impact of the internal border 
on markets connected by mobile phones, remains positive and statistically 
significant for all specifications.
We might be concerned about potential bias due to correlation between 
the internal border effect and unobserved covariates. The lower panel of 
table 6.4 tests for the equality of means of market- level covariates on either 
side of the internal border. We fail to find evidence of a statistically signifi-
cant difference for most market- level covariates, including market size, the 
frequency of drought, road quality, distance between markets, and urban 
status. The notable exception is mobile phone coverage, with a strong statisti-
cally significant difference between the two groups.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter began by asking whether international market integration is 
feasible in sub- Saharan Africa. We find evidence of an international border 
effect between Niger and Nigeria, but the magnitude of this effect is much 
smaller than that found in industrialized countries. Thus, the border does 
not pose a deep threat to the success of existing regional economic com-
missions that have attempted to foster cross- border trade, even when two 
countries do not share a common currency. These results suggest that the 
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Walrasian auctioneer can be heard across the Niger- Nigeria border. Her 
voice carries especially well within her ethnic community, or with the aid of 
a mobile phone.
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